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Paul Ryan and the Press1
Just as the offi  ce of the vice president of the United States has gained new 
importance during the past several decades, there is generally more infor-
mation about vice-presidential activities in the national media. In addition 
to the governing period, broadened coverage also includes the presidential 
campaign, and there are certain periods of such when running mates receive 
extensive media exposure. Generally, this is also only periodical, unless one 
is Spiro Agnew, Dan Quayle, and Sarah Palin, as the conventional wisdom is 
that “if a running mate is still on the front page three days aft er their nomina-
tion, there is a problem” (quoted in: Ulbig 2010: 333).
At the same time it is very important to follow how the media – the press 
(or print media) in particular – cover vice-presidential candidates, as they 
seem to be the sole entity to do some evaluating of them. Running mates are 
picked by the presumptive nominees and their advisers, frequently with the 
purpose of maximizing their electoral chances. Convention delegates sim-
ply ratify the pick, and since “no one votes for the vice president per se,” 
(Schlesinger 1974: 483-484) as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote four decades 
ago, voters, on aggregate (Adkison 1982), rarely think of the second spot 
when considering their presidential vote, although on the individual level the 
vice-presidential candidate might have some slight infl uence (Romero 2001; 
Ulbig 2010). As electors simply follow voters’ instructions, the press seems to 
be the last resort for questioning and challenging the vice-presidential choice. 
And, as frequently at the time of their selection vice-presidential candidates 
are known only to a handful of political junkies, it is the duty of the press to 
introduce running mates to the American people. Th us, knowing how the 
press describes vice-presidential hopefuls might be critical for public opinion 
in their evaluation of the running mates, and maybe even the presidential 
vote of some citizens.
1 Th is article was supported by funding from the Jagiellonian University within the SET 
project. Th e project is co-fi nanced by the European Union.
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Shortly aft er Paul Ryan’s selection as vice-presidential candidate on the 
ticket with Mitt Romney, half of the American public viewed the pick as posi-
tive, while a quarter had no opinion about Ryan (Kopicki 2012). If this was 
to change during the course of the campaign, the information that would 
transform their evaluation would be acquired from the media. Even though 
the most common sources of political information are television and the In-
ternet, the press and reporters, in particular those of major papers, still pos-
sess the trust of the public in many respects. Many a time print media stories 
are the source of TV reports and Internet content, not mentioning that major 
print media organizations own a vast number of web news services. Th is way, 
the same content that is printed in Th e New York Times or Th e Wall Street 
Journal appears on numerous websites, just as it has been with syndicated 
columns.
In this paper I am interested in how print media covered the recent vice-
presidential candidate, Representative Paul Ryan, and the way he was intro-
duced to the American people. Due to several reasons, which are not always 
clear, the press tends to cover and present vice-presidential hopefuls diff er-
ently. When Republicans who were under the age of fi ft y, such as Dan Quayle 
or Sarah Palin, joined the presidential ticket, the coverage was that if they 
became vice presidents, not to mention the unthinkable happens, it would 
be nothing but a national disaster. When the only representative in recent 
memory, Geraldine Ferraro, became Walter Mondale’s vice-presidential can-
didate in 1984, the narrative was that the only reason she had received the 
nod was because she was a woman: she “had been three terms in the House, 
but so [had] several dozen male congressmen no one ever heard mentioned 
for Vice President” (Germond, Witcover 1985: 356).
So was it diff erent in the case of Paul Ryan, a 42-year-old representative 
from Wisconsin? Why? Did the press consider his selection as predictable 
or rather unusual? Was he considered as short-term, made to boost electoral 
chances, or rather a strategic choice, a person that would help to govern and 
be an infl uential player in the Romney administration? How did the press 
reports evaluate his choice in the context of the campaign dynamics? Would 
he, according to the press, help or rather hinder Mitt Romney? Finally, what 
leverage, whatever the electoral fortune of the Romney-Ryan ticket, would 
this nomination have on the future political career of Paul Ryan?
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Data and methods
In order to answer these questions, a content analysis of a combined number 
of fi ve American major newspapers and magazines will be conducted. Th e 
sources include three dailies: Th e New York Times, Th e Washington Post, and 
Th e Wall Street Journal, along with two weekly magazines, Time and News-
week. Th ese titles were called by Stephen Hess the most infl uential in the 
U.S. news organization hierarchy (Hess 1981), and in his list he also included 
Th e U.S. News and World Report, as well as Th e Washington Star. I am not go-
ing to do so, as three decades have passed since Hess’s study, and the dynam-
ics of the U.S. press market is that the Star does not exist anymore, and News 
and World Report is not as infl uential it used to be. Th us the fi ve newspaper 
sources are taken into consideration, the fi ve that still constitute “an inner 
ring in the solar system of the Washington news gathering” (Hess 1981: 24). 
Not only is it also conventional wisdom, but apparently it has not changed 
according to Hess himself – he does not cover this issue in the most recent 
and fi nal piece of his so-called “Newswork” series, Whatever Happened to 
the Washington Reporters, 1978-2012 (Hess 2012). Th e content analysis of 
those sources was also successfully applied by Mark Rozell in his three vol-
umes, where he assessed relations of the press corps with three American 
presidents, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush (Rozell 1989; 
Rozell 1992; Rozell 1996).
In this paper I am, however, interested in how the press reacted to the 
choice of Paul Ryan and how reporters described the Wisconsin representa-
tive in terms of his ability, or lack thereof, to infl uence presidential decisions 
and thus the presumptive Romney administration. Th e question of being 
“of presidential caliber,” whether vice-presidential hopefuls possessed presi-
dential qualifi cations or not, is one of the most central in the contemporary 
vice-presidential selection, even if its conceptualization and operationaliza-
tion seem to be far from objective. Because what does having presidential 
qualifi cations mean?
Th is concept is far from being measurable, if this is at all possible. Basi-
cally, there is no school, college, or educational track whose graduates would 
be certifi ed in having mastered the skills to lead the American nation. At the 
same time, we might argue that many a time those who were thought of as 
meeting all the necessary criteria turned out to be mediocre chief executives. 
And even some two-term commanders-in-chief were thought of as having 
not learned to become a  leader even aft er their lengthy time in offi  ce. Yet, 
even if “no certain measure of ability to be President exists” (Goldstein 1982: 
83), aft er each selection and every campaign, the consensus emerges whether 
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the candidate was a good choice, i.e. if it was safe for the country that they 
could have been a heartbeat away from the Presidency.
To examine this in relation to Paul Ryan, a qualitative analysis of newspa-
per articles will be conducted. Instead of merely counting and descriptively 
reporting the numbers of articles about Paul Ryan, I will evaluate the charac-
ter of the press reports about him. First, I will start by shedding some light on 
his activities prior to the vice-presidential selection. Th en I will discuss how 
the press portrayed Ryan within the fi ve time frames that are the focal point 
of any vice-presidential candidate coverage: aft er the selection announce-
ment, before and aft er the convention speech, around the vice-presidential 
debate, shortly before Election Day, and aft er the election is concluded. It is 
at this last point when the press evaluates running mates’ contribution to the 
standard bearers’ electoral fortunes and speculates about their role in the new 
administration or the political future, if the ticket happens to be unsuccessful.
Th us the articles between July 15th, 2012, and November 15th, 2012, will 
be examined, and the data collected by setting this time frame for each of the 
newspaper sources. Th e articles were collected by simply typing ‘Paul Ryan’ 
into the search engine of the Proquest database. Typically, before any general 
election campaign kicks off , the public is in the possession of less information 
about the running mate than the standard bearer. Yet it oft en changes with 
the dynamics of the campaign. Also, since “total information is, by defi ni-
tion, the sum of preexisting information and campaign information” (Bartels 
1993: 724), it seems desirable to take a look at the coverage before and aft er 
the selection was made, as well as during the campaign.
Paul Ryan: the poli  cian
Unlike Geraldine Ferraro, Dan Quayle, or Sarah Palin, Paul Ryan won the 
recognition of the national media long before he was selected as Mitt Rom-
ney’s vice-presidential candidate. At 42, already serving his 7th term in the 
House, for a long time, and by all the examined press sources, Ryan had been 
considered as the “intellectual leader of the Republican Party” (Calmes 2012; 
O’Connor 2012; Tumulty, Sonmez 2012). Campaign worker and congres-
sional staff er of such conservative champions as Sam Brownback and Jack 
Kemp, Ryan quickly found a way to become a Congressman himself. Aft er 
the 2006 midterm elections, when GOP lost the majority in Congress, mak-
ing George W. Bush a lame duck president, Republican congressional leader-
ship made a few bold moves to prepare the party – both in government and 
in the electorate – for the post-Bush era. One of them was the promotion of 
303Paul Ryan and the Press
Paul Ryan. With the leadership endorsement, the seniority was bypassed, 
making Ryan a ranking member of the House Budget Committee (Fahrent-
hold, Kane 2012). His role in this body rose signifi cantly, culminating aft er 
the 2010 Republican House takeover, when he became the chairman of the 
Budget Committee, and an infl uential member of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
Ryan’s visibility in these gatherings ensured his national stature due to 
several factors. First, with a degree in economics, Ryan knew his talk, gradu-
ally becoming the architect of his party’s fi scal policy. As successor of Jack 
Kemp in the conservative movement, Ryan has considered himself as deeply 
infl uenced by the libertarian thinker Ayn Rand. Th is situates his views far 
right, which is visible in his policy proposals. Th us, when Ryan presented 
his versions of the United States budget, fi rst in 2008, and then in 2009, 2010 
and 2011, he instantly became a darling of the conservatives and Tea Party, 
as his proposals suggested spending cuts in many social welfare programs, 
with simultaneous income and corporate tax cuts. In recognition of his role 
as one of the Republican leaders, Ryan was selected to deliver his party’s an-
swer to the presidential State of the Union Address in 2011 (Barbaro 2012). 
Finally, aft er winning primaries in Washington, D.C., Maryland and Wiscon-
sin, Mitt Romney reached the status of presumptive presidential nominee, 
and the press had already started their speculation about the potential vice-
presidential choice. At fi rst, Ryan was not among the heavyweights: reporters’ 
types were closer to Senators Rob Portman of Ohio and Marco Rubio of Flor-
ida, who were soon followed by former Minnesota Governor and 2012 GOP 
nomination contender, Tim Pawlenty (Balz 2012). But closer to the selection 
announcement, Ryan’s chances grew. With the speculations at their highest 
point, Th e Wall Street Journal issued a  now-famous editorial asking “Why 
Not Paul Ryan?” Th e editorial board argued that “Th e case for Mr. Ryan is 
that he best exemplifi es the nature and stakes of this election. More than any 
other politician, the House Budget Chairman has defi ned those stakes well 
as a generational choice about the role of government and whether America 
will once again become a growth economy or sink into interest-group domi-
nated decline” (Editorial 2012). Th e board identifi ed Ryan as the future of the 
Republican Party, exemplifi ed by young, but already experienced, legislators 
such as Ryan, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, or California representa-
tive Kevin McCarthy, who presented their vision of the Republican agenda 
for the United States in the book Young Guns: A New Generation of Conser-
vative Leaders, published in 2010. When, just one day aft er the editorial was 
printed, Mitt Romney announced his vice-presidential choice, the future had 
arrived.
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Paul Ryan: the vice-presiden  al nominee
Th e choice of Ryan was examined by the national press on several levels. Dis-
tinguishing between the short-term and long-term criteria of vice-presidential 
selection, clearly the short term (tactical) are those that would boost a ticket’s 
electoral chances, whereas the long term (strategic) would be those when the 
running mate is selected due to his/her prospective abilities in helping to gov-
ern (Nelson 1988; Hiller, Kriner 2008). From the electoral point of view, Ryan 
was seen as balancing the Republican ticket in several critical areas.
More than two decades younger than Romney, the vice-presidential can-
didate possessed impressive legislative experience, covering an area that the 
former Massachusetts governor lacked. While Romney was a proponent of 
less bureaucracy, less spending and tax cuts because his business instinct told 
him so, with a  background in economics, Ryan was seen as being able to 
frame the ideas and views they both shared into the language of policy debate 
and proposals. As a devoted Catholic, the Wisconsin congressman was also 
expected to assure the religious voters and organizations, along with the cul-
ture warriors, that the Republican ticket, and the then administration, would 
be addressing values important to them.
From the campaign perspective, the selection of Ryan was perceived as 
Mitt Romney acting unusually boldly, when he could have easily settled with 
the safe choice of one of the fi nalists mentioned earlier. Yet the pick was also 
seen as the reset of a campaign, if not a potential game changer, similar to the 
one aft er Sarah Palin was chosen in 2008 (Heilemann, Halperin 2010), albeit 
in the opposite direction. It could have served as Romney’s new opening in 
two respects. First, aft er clinching the Republican nomination, the Romney 
organization and the candidate himself had made several avoidable mistakes. 
Etch the Sketch, remarks about the London Olympic Games, and disastrous 
foreign trips to Great Britain, Israel, and Poland did not resonate well with 
reporters. Th e negative media spin, strengthened by Democrat-prepared ads, 
presenting Romney as a mediocre leader, could have cost the Republicans 
a lot (Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012a). Secondly, Obama’s campaign strategy was to 
defi ne Romney early as a heartless businessman who would wage war on the 
poor and would destroy the middle class. Considering that Obama’s nega-
tive strategy was fully operational and in full force as of early summer 2012 
(Th rush, Martin 2012), the selection of Ryan was supposed to cut it in half, 
forcing the president to change his tone, stop discussing his opponents per-
sonality, and start debating issues on a policy level (Baker 2012).
Particularly this second reason appealed to the journalistic world, which 
was tired of negativity and hoped to start covering a serious debate that would 
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concentrate on the most pressing areas of U.S. domestic policy. Th e press also 
pointed out the fact that fi nally there was a possibility for this. As both sides 
agreed that changes in the cost-generating federal government programs 
were needed, the only thing to do was to sit down and work out the  de-
tails (Hook, Paletta 2012; Samuelson 2012). On the other hand, it is in the
details where the devil is, not only in contemporary American politics.
What is interesting is that the choice of Paul Ryan also pleased the third 
group with vital stakes in this election – the Democrats. When Ryan pre-
sented his budget proposals, the Democrats argued that it would dismantle 
the system that Americans have been building since the initiation of FDR’s 
New Deal and LBJ’s Great Society. Th is argument was apparently a catchy one, 
as some points in Ryan’s proposals were condemned by the American Catho-
lic Church’s highest authorities as being in opposition to Christian values of 
assisting the poor (Nicholas, Peters 2012). For months, when Mitt Romney 
emerged as the GOP primaries’ frontrunner, and then presumptive nominee, 
Democrats painted him as agreeing with Ryan’s vision of “ending Medicare as 
we know it” (Blake 2012; Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012b). So now, when Ryan was 
invited to join the ticket, this kind of narrative would be even stronger, and 
Democrats considered Romney’s move as a political gift , particularly as it was 
not a secret that, according to the press hype, Ryan “was promised a role of 
administration’s architect in a drive to enact a budget that shrinks the govern-
ment and overhauls programs like Medicare” (Gabriel 2012a).
When it comes to reporting on the public opinion of Ryan, shortly aft er 
he was selected the shift  was rather positive. In the Gallup/USA Today poll 
more of the people surveyed (50% to 30%) thought of Paul Ryan as quali-
fi ed for the presidency (Kopicki 2012). In the Washington Post/ABC News 
survey, “38 percent viewed Ryan favorably, up from 23 percent who said so 
just a  few days earlier” (Kopicki 2012). In general, Ryan gave Romney an 
expected boost with conservatives, which also translated into fundraising 
numbers – Romney campaign spokesman Andrea Saul reported that within 
72 hours of the selection announcement, the campaign raised $7.4 million 
online (Camia 2012).
As the media reacted to the selection of Ryan rather well – without a sin-
gle mention that he was unqualifi ed for the highest offi  ce – only time would 
tell whether Paul Ryan would deliver what was expected of him in the realm 
of the presidential campaign.
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Paul Ryan: the campaigner
In a very interesting paper in which Diana Carlin and Peter Bicak tried to 
establish a theory about the purpose of vice-presidential debates, they argued 
that it is a venue in which “a candidate must demonstrate fi tness to assume 
the presidency – an offi  ce he or she is not actually seeking; defi ne his or her 
role as a vice president and demonstrate fi tness for that offi  ce as well; con-
tribute to a better understanding of the presidential running mate’s virtues; 
respond to attacks on policies and character in a manner that the presidential 
nominee could not; and lodge more direct attacks on the opponents, espe-
cially the presidential running mate, than could be made in a direct matchup 
between presidential nominees” (Carlin, Bicak 1993: 122). One might ar-
gue that these are the expectations and responsibilities of vice presidential 
candidates not only in the debates, but in the entire presidential campaign. 
If we add here running mates’ campaign tasks distinguished in classic vice-
presidential scholarship, we can easily observe that in this respect Paul Ryan 
covered all of these tasks in the 2012 race.
One of the fi rst occasions for such is when there comes a  moment for 
the candidates to introduce themselves to the American people. Th is hap-
pens during the national party conventions, when candidates deliver nation-
ally broadcast addresses, accepting their nominations and offi  cially becom-
ing their party’s nominees. Th ough Ryan’s speech was directed mainly to the 
conservative base, the press widely criticized the Congressman for several 
misstatements, including inaccuracy about when the General Motors plant in 
Janesville, Wisconsin, had been shut down, or that he accused the president 
of having rejected recommendations of the Simpson-Bowles commission 
(Parker 2012).
Th e most important role for Paul Ryan was in the vice-presidential de-
bate with Joe Biden. Unexpectedly, the incumbent vice president, Joe Biden, 
was in a similar position to George H. W. Bush in the 1984 election. Both 
then and in 2012, the sitting presidents decisively lost their fi rst presidential 
debates to, respectively, Walter Mondale and Mitt Romney. Th us, in both in-
stances, the task for the vice presidents was not to lose again, and preventing 
the challengers from gaining momentum that could have turned the presi-
dential race upside down.
However, the stakes in 2012 were even higher, as the fi rst debate resulted 
in a complete reset of the race, even allowing Mitt Romney to have a slim lead 
according to several polls. Conservatives started to believe that the race was 
not yet over, as almost everyone interested had thought a week before. One 
of the exemplifi cations might be the fact that within 48 hours aft er the fi rst 
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debate, the Romney campaign had raised as much as 12 million dollars in 
online contributions alone (Confessore 2012). So if Paul Ryan had followed 
the path, the Republican ticket advantage might have even increased.
Unfortunately for Ryan, he faced a Washington veteran who had been at 
the highest levels of American politics for nearly four decades, being fi rst 
elected to the Senate in 1972, when the Republican running mate was only 
two years old. Before becoming vice president, Joe Biden had run twice for 
presidential nomination, and had kept minor, ranking, and major positions 
in two of the most important Senate bodies – the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Judiciary Committee. He also had gained valuable experi-
ence during the 2008 campaign, when he debated against Sarah Palin. From 
the opening statements, the debate was “sharp, spirited, and confrontational,” 
according to the press (Stanley 2012; Lee, Meckler, McCain Nelson 2012). Joe 
Biden was at the off ensive from the start, defending the president’s and his 
record, and attacking Romney and Ryan’s policy proposals. In return, Ryan 
had chosen to deliver “point-by-point rebuttal” (Zeleny, Rutenberg 2012b), 
calmly and cautiously defending his standard-bearer and himself. He argued 
that it was actually the Democratic administration that was keen on “cut-
ting $716 billion in Medicare funding to fi nance the administration’s health 
care program” (Balz, Rucker 2012), coined as Obamacare. Th e debate was 
indeed lively and tough, and was viewed as not having a clear winner. It was 
described as one of the “meatiest political conversation in many years” (Edi-
torial 2012a), but still a “fi rst-rate performance” (Seib 2012). Unfortunately 
for Ryan, the instant polling showed Joe Biden as a winner, with a score of 
48-44 in the CNN poll, and 50-31 in the CBS survey (Samuelson 2012). But 
even though Ryan had been unable to sustain the Romney momentum, the 
opinion of his performance was rather positive, even if the tone of the evalua-
tion was slightly diff erent, due to obvious reasons, in Th e New York Times and 
Th e Wall Street Journal.
What the media paid particular attention to during the course of the cam-
paign was also how two people on the same ticket, Mitt Romney and Paul 
Ryan, were to resolve their policy diff erences, as they were dissimilar in many 
ways. As it oft en is in political campaigns, it is better to hide or even omit 
some issues or policy proposals in order not to scare independent voters. Yet 
in 2012, it was impossible for Republicans to hide Ryan’s vision, in particular 
on changes to the Medicare program, as it was the centerpiece of his fi scal 
proposals and the path toward a balanced budget. Ideas of gradually turning 
Medicare into a voucher program, raising the eligibility age for Social Security, 
deep cuts in the food stamps program, and increasing the Medicare cost to 
$6,400, as refl ected in the Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO) estimate (Calmes 
2012), were heavily exploited by the Democrats, and many reporters speculat-
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ed how Mitt Romney might want to answer the allegations that it would also 
become his agenda if elected. What is striking here is the fact that within less 
than a day aft er the announcement that Paul Ryan had been selected, Rom-
ney’s spokesman claimed that the GOP standard-bearer actually did not fully 
support Ryan’s fi scal positions (Editorial 2012a), which caused some eyebrows 
to be raised in the press. Closer to the election, many in conservative circles 
were complaining that since the selection was made, “Ryan looked more like 
Romney – vague, cautious, and limited to present talking points” (Sonmez, 
Fahrenthold 2012), not the other way around, as they had hoped.
On the electoral hard-data level, Ryan did not help Romney much. If he 
had been selected with hopes of turning Wisconsin red and putting Ohio, 
where Ryan had studied at Miami University and still had many friends, into 
the Republican columns, the mission was unsuccessful. More importantly, 
a new national status also seemed unhelpful to the Ryan race itself, as he won 
with the lowest number ever – less than 55 percent (Kane, Fahrenthold 2012). 
Yet, as Th e New York Times reported, there were some that actually thought 
Ryan did more harm than good to Mitt Romney. One research fellow claimed 
that “Romney lost the election … because of Paul Ryan,” who supposedly had 
“moved Romney so hard to the right it was hard for him to move back to the 
middle” (quoted in: Santos 2012). One article in Th e Washington Post also 
stated that it was actually Ryan’s plan for Medicare that had been the decisive 
factor in the race (Bouie 2012), although Ryan himself rejected this notion 
(Sonmez 2012) and it was not indicated in the post-election polls.
Paul Ryan: future GOP leader?
When the president of the United States is reelected, the next presidential cy-
cle is one with a so-called open election, as the chief executive cannot hold the 
offi  ce for a third time. Th us, usually the day aft er the election day is already full 
of speculations about who might run in four years, and both vice-presidential 
candidates tend to be at the center of those speculations. When it comes to Joe 
Biden, people wonder whether in 2016 he would not be perceived as too old 
for the highest offi  ce, whether the Obama administration’s record will be plau-
sible enough to run on it in the Democratic Party contest, whether the vice 
president himself will decide to seek the nomination, and, most importantly, 
what Joe Biden would do if Hillary Clinton entered the race.
When it comes to Paul Ryan, the question goes far beyond 2016, as some 
argue that in the next cycle he will still be too young to run for the presidency 
(Barnes 2012). Ryan seems to be deliberately cutting himself off  from those 
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speculations, claiming that his interests lie in policy debates, which he is able 
to infl uence through his current position in the House Budget Committee 
and the chairmanship of the Ways and Means Committee he wants to seek in 
the future (Tumulty, Sonmez 2012). At the same time, Ryan himself and the 
press cannot escape conversations about his future role in electoral politics.
Whereas the 2012 “defeat is a  political career-ender for Mitt Romney” 
(Gabriel 2012b), this is not the case with Paul Ryan. As Paul Light argued, 
being as much as a vice-presidential candidate, even on a losing ticket, gives 
politicians a  boost they might use to increase their electoral and political 
status. While “nothing helps … look quite as presidential as campaigning, 
speaking and public liaison” (Light 1984: 117), it also gives several oppor-
tunities to meet state and local leaders, form friendships and alliances, and 
build coalitions which might prove useful and fruitful in the future. Before 
the selection, Ryan was widely known and admired among the highest levels 
of Republican circles, party leadership, the right-leaning media, think tanks 
and outside groups. Even before that he had developed quite an impressive 
fundraising machine, one of the most effi  cient among the House members. 
Aft er the race, Paul Ryan’s name is now also known at the grassroots level. 
Not only has he reportedly gained more confi dence (Tumulty, Sonmez 2012), 
but also “was invigorated by the race, despite the fears it would wear him 
down” (O’Connor 2012). What is also important from the electoral perspec-
tive is the very fact that in 2012 both Iowa and New Hampshire were swing 
states and required many presidential and vice-presidential candidates’ visits, 
in future Republican presidential primaries it might be useful that someone 
has already become acquainted with the turf there.
As John Heilemann argued, “Ryan’s GOP future is bright” (Heilemann 
2012), even more so on the policy-developing levels. At the age of 42, he is 
already considered a top fi scal policy expert, and in years to come the gen-
eration of politicians born in the 1970s and later shall become more and 
more infl uential with the Republican leadership, and broadly defi ned circles. 
Th us, combining his expertise, alleged ability to speak to young, modern vot-
ers, and the very fact that whatever negotiations take place with the White 
House on defi cit and debt reduction, debt limit, or fi scal issues, Ryan will be 
at the center of events. At the same time, being the “most high-profi le foil 
to Obama and his policies” (Cillizza 2012), he will surely be the favorite of 
his party base. Th erefore, with the national name identifi cation, recognition 
as the policy wonk, and admiration among people from all three segments2 
of the Republican Party, along with donors and outside groups, Ryan’s vice-
2 Party in government, party in the electorate, party as an organization, as identifi ed by 
V. O. Key, Jr. (Key 1964).
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presidential nod looks more and more like a win-win situation. According 
to Joseph Schlesinger’s theory of political ambition, a “strategic decision is 
not whether to run but when to run: now or when the winning prospects are 
higher” (Schlesinger 1966). Whenever Ryan chooses to run for president, he 
shall be considered an instant frontrunner.
Conclusion: Paul Ryan and the press
Paul Ryan is the kind of politician reporters enjoy to have around: young, 
speaking modern language, articulate and knowledgeable, someone who 
knows what he is talking about. At the same time, he has been in politics long 
enough to learn how the media operates and the importance of soundbites, 
so he is frequently ready to deliver quotable phrases. If we add the reports of 
him being one of the most highly likable people among his congressional col-
leagues and holding an infl uential position in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, there seem to be no reasons why the media would disrespect him.
Th us, when he was elevated to the position of vice-presidential candi-
date, the media’s reaction was very positive. Th is had previously not always 
been the case. Th e selection of Spiro Agnew, Dan Quayle, and Sarah Palin 
caught the media unprepared, possibly because these fi gures were not fi rst 
line politicians, oft en not highly regarded in the most infl uential political 
circles.
Th is was not the case with Paul Ryan, who was unanimously judged as 
being of presidential caliber. Clearly, Ryan received a lot of criticism, yet it 
seems it was due to his policy proposals, and not on meritorial grounds. Even 
the most ardent critic of Paul Ryan, Th e New York Times columnist and eco-
nomics professor Paul Krugman, never wrote that Ryan was unprepared for 
the role of second man. Th us, unlike Dan Quayle, whose coverage was not 
particularly positive, or Sarah Palin, whose relationship with the media has 
been probably the rockiest one in recent memory, Paul Ryan can be certain 
that in his future political career he will not have to face the entity many poli-
ticians fear the most – the press.
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